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Social instability and redistribution of income
Abstract
Rational agents can express discontent with a given distribution of income by threatening to disrupt an
economy, if such a threat is profitable. This paper describes such circumstances in a two-class model.
Social stability constraints define the acceptable set of income distributions, the range of which is
determined by the extent to which income-generating abilities are vulnerable to disruption.
Opportunities for disruption vary across stages of economic development. There is possibly no stable
distribution in a low developed economy, whereas in an advanced economy, characterized by complex
and interdependent production, stable distributions exist. This distinction provides a basis for the
observed increasing significance of social stabilization by redistributive policy in the course of
economic development.
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Abstract
Rational agents can express discontent with a given distribution of income by threaten-
ing to disrupt an economy, if such a threat is profitable. This paper describes such
circumstances in a two-class model. Social stability constraints define the acceptable set of
income distributions, the range of which is determined by the extent to which income-gen-
erating abilities are vulnerable to disruption. Opportunities for disruption vary across stages
of economic development. There is possibly no stable distribution in a low developed
economy, whereas in an advanced economy, characterized by complex and interdependent
production, stable distributions exist. This distinction provides a basis for the observed
increasing significance of social stabilization by redistributive policy in the course of
economic development. q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
It is the purpose of this paper to analyse the redistributive role of the state as a
means of ensuring social stability. Social stability is of course a complex phe-
nomenon which is influenced by many factors, including exogenous shocks see
.Bellettini, 1998 . My focus in this paper is on the relationship between income
distribution and stability of a society.
The relationship between inequality and socio-political instability has long been
 .discussed in the political sciences. Huntington 1968, p. 569 points out that
Aristotle in his Politics observed that ‘‘the cause of sedition is always to be found
) Fax: q49-0941-943-4941; E-mail: josef.falkinger@wiwi.uni-regensburg.de
0176-2680r99r$ - see front matter q 1999 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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 .in inequality’’. Russett 1970 traces the discussion back to Tocqueville and
Euripides. Using various indicators of socio-political instability Taylor and Hud-
.son, 1972; Hibbs, 1973 , several authors have investigated the role of inequality
and political instability in economic models for instance, Gupta, 1977; Gupta and
.Venieris, 1981; Venieris and Gupta, 1989 . The relationship between inequality
and socio-political instability has also become a prominent topic in recent research
 .  .on economic growth. Alesina and Perotti 1996 and Perotti 1996 provide
empirical evidence which ties instability to income inequality. For a cross-section
of 71 countries for the period 1960–1985, they show that income inequality
increases social discontent and the probability of coups, revolutions, mass vio-
lence, etc. Socio-political instability thus has a negative impact on investment and
 .growth see Benabou, 1996, for a survey .´
I do not intend to pursue the question of how social instability affects
accumulation and growth. My purpose is to explain why we observe more or less
severe forms of social instability in different countries, and why the redistributive
role of the state as a means of ensuring social stability is more or less significant at
different stages of economic development.
The question is how people can express their dissatisfaction about a given
distribution of a society’s economic opportunities. In an economy focusing on
inherited stocks of wealth, people who disagree with the given distribution may try
to take the property of other people away. Strong coercive power is a means of
stabilizing the existing order. In an economy focusing on production, people have
other possibilities to protest against a certain distribution. In particular, they can
disrupt the production possibilities of the economy. As long as the production
possibilities of different groups are more or less independent, one group can
disrupt the possibilities of other groups without disturbing at the same time its own
production possibilities. In an advanced economy with fully developed labour
division we have complex and interdependent production methods. Therefore, a
group disrupting the production possibilities of others affects usually also its own
possibilities.
This paper develops a model in which the possibilities to protest against a given
distribution are determined by the people’s abilities to survive disturbances. Social
stability means that no group has an incentive to protest against the given
distribution. The model suggests that at low stages of economic development the
range of stable distributions is empty or biased in favour of elites. This may
explain why in less developed countries alternating revolts and elites based on
 .military power can be observed Kimenyi and Mbaku, 1995 . In an advanced
economy stable distributions exist, but they are only achieved after some redistri-
bution. This may explain why institutions for ensuring social stability by income
policy or redistributive measures are common in advanced economies with com-
plex and interdependent production methods.
Having described the basic idea and its political implication, I turn to specific
features of my analysis and its relationship to the relevant literature.
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In my analysis social instability restricts the part of the Pareto-frontier which is
feasible. In particular, the market solution may be excluded. To avoid Pareto-inef-
ficient disruption, the income distribution in an economy must fall in the stable
range. The stability problem which confronts a government in this case is in a
certain sense the mirror image of the optimal redistributive taxation problem.
Whereas the latter deals with the efficiency loss of too much redistribution, the
former is concerned with possible efficiency losses arising from too little redistri-
 .bution. Optimal income taxation theory see Mirrlees, 1971 asks how redistribu-
tion possibilities are restricted by the fact that people, especially the more able,
 .can withdraw their abilities and efforts from productive and hence taxable
 .activity see also Buchanan and Faith, 1987, on political secession . The social
stability-constraint which I derive describes how income inequality is restricted by
the threat of social disturbances. It depends on the distribution of abilities in
production, and the abilities to survive disturbances. The latter differ according to
stages of development.
I look at the distribution of incomes. Inequality or redistribution of wealth is
not considered. Here I differ from models of social conflict, where one group can
appropriate the property of another see Skaperdas, 1992; Grossman, 1995 or
.Hirshleifer, 1995. See also Brennan, 1973 . My model also differs from Hirshleifer
 .1991 who describes agents dividing their resources between income-producing
efforts and efforts determining how the income is distributed. 1 In my model,
people are endowed with personal abilities which cannot be appropriated by other
people. The productivity with which an agent’s ability is employed to earn income
can, however, be negatively affected by disruptive activities of other agents. For
example, a strike by one group has a negative effect on the productivity of others.
I analyze, in a non-cooperative game, the conditions under which a group can
credibly threaten to disturb the economy. Social stability is achieved if for no
group such a threat is an equilibrium strategy.
Stability of the social order plays also a central role in the Hobbesian or
 .constitutional perspective on the state see Buchanan, 1975a . The primary func-
tion of the state is the establishment of order to avoid anarchic chaos. This
approach emphasizes that social stability requires enforcement of basic rights by
coercive power. My analysis focuses on the role of distributive equity as a
prerequisite for a stable social order. In this sense, my analysis is closer to the idea
 .of John Rawls Rawls, 1971 that a society must be just and fair to be accepted by
its members. However, my study is not concerned with ethical principles, but is
focused on the economic calculus of rational agents who decide in a non-cooper-
ative way whether to threaten to disrupt the economy. The benchmark from which
distribution policy is discussed is not an original position behind the veil of
1  .This is also the focus of the rent-seeking literature see the survey by Nitzan, 1994 .
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ignorance, nor Hobbesian anarchy, but such threat possibilities, which will differ
among groups and which may change over time.
My model does not seek to derive the right constitution or a general principle of
justice, but leads to a characterization, based on objective economic indicators, of
the stability constraints faced by any distributive policy whether determined by
.constitutions or voting procedures or social-welfare maximization . The condition
for social stability depends on agents’ power to threaten. This is related to the
 .approach of Aumann and Kurz 1977 who argue that the analysis of redistribution
has to be based on considerations associated with the power structure in an
economy. Unlike Aumann and Kurz, however, I do not consider majority voting
or any other procedure of collective decision making. This paper does not deal
with optimal or equilibrium rules for sharing total income. My more basic question
is how, in an economy with self-interested agents, the requisites of social stability
limit the range of possible outcomes for any procedure of choosing the distribution
of incomes. The limit is defined by the requirement that no agent should have an
incentive to threaten to disrupt the economy. In other words, the decision not to
threaten must be a subgame perfect equilibrium. Since my analysis is based on a
two-class model, problems of coalition formation do not enter.
The idea that government redistribution may be beneficial to both taxpayers and
recipients of transfers is also found the literature on Pareto-optimal redistribution
Hochman and Rodgers, 1969, 1974; see also Mishan, 1972 for a critical evalua-
.tion . The assumption in this literature is that the utility of the rich depends also on
the income of the poor. In the present analysis, there are no utility interdependen-
cies. Individuals do not have altruistic preferences. Therefore, there is also no
 .‘Samaritan’s Dilemma’ Buchanan, 1975b . The effect of redistribution on effi-
ciency is through a more indirect channel: Via social stability, the distribution of
income affects the production possibilities of the poor as well as rich.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the limits of redistribu-
tion arising from the equity–efficiency trade-off as considered in optimal income
taxation theory. Section 3 develops the relationship between instability and
efficiency, and explains the mechanism relating inequity to instability. The
mechanism gives rise to a stability constraint derived in Section 4 limiting the
feasibility of non-redistribution. Section 5 contains reflections on the possibility
that the threat of destabilization might not come from the poor, but from the rich.
Conclusions are set out in Section 6.
2. Equity and efficiency in optimum income taxation theory
Consider a two-class economy with two representative types of individuals
is1,2. The two types of individuals differ in the abilities a , is1,2, fori
generating income. Individual 1 is less able than individual 2. Denote by x and y
 .  .gross and net income, respectively. For any point V in the x, y -space, let u Vi
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Fig. 1. Utility possibility frontier.
be the utility level achieved by individual i if gross income x has to be earned to
secure net income y. Fig. 1 describes the possible utility levels of individual 1 and
individual 2. If no social stability problem exists, and if redistributive lump-sum
taxation is feasible, then the utility-possibilities frontier is given by FG.
Without redistribution, individuals’ incomes are equal to market incomes and
the relatively more able individual 2 is better off than individual 1. This market
outcome is represented by point M in Fig. 1. If lump-sum taxes were available,
then any point along the frontier FG could be achieved by redistribution. 2
However, if abilities are not observable, distortionary taxes are required for
redistributing income. An equity efficiency trade-off then exists. The set of utility
possibilities shrinks, if the government tries to redistribute from the market
solution towards a more egalitarian distribution. The second-best utility frontier
MR describes the possible utility levels. Point R is the Rawlsian solution where
the less able individual 1 is best off. 3 If the income distribution imposed by fiscal
policy tends to be too egalitarian, able people can withdraw their participation in
2 Under the assumption that leisure is a normal good, utilitarian lump-sum taxation would lead to a
 .point P to the right of the 458-ray see for instance, Stiglitz, 1987 . Thus, at any point to the left of P
the absolute value of the slope of the frontier must be less than one.
3  .See, for instance, Aktinson and Stiglitz 1980 for a derivation of this second-best utility
possibilities frontier.
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the production of the redistributed cake. 4 That this ‘power’ has to be taken into
account by any redistribution policy is well understood from optimum income
taxation analysis.
We can now ask: Do the poor also have power to refuse an income distribution
which is too unfavorable for them? The analysis in Section 3 addresses this
question.
3. Inequity, instability and inefficiency
Let um, is1,2, be the utility levels corresponding to the market solution,i
represented by point M in Fig. 2. 5 Suppose that government redistributes some
income from the more able individual 2 to the less able individual 1 so that the
resulting utility levels are u )um and u -um. Can individual 1 protest and1 1 2 2
demand more redistribution?
If a revolution leads only to the removal of the redistributive state, so that after
the revolution the market solution is realized, the poor could only loose by
revolting. However, this is a highly unrealistic scenario. More realistically, any
form of a severe protest, from strikes to revolts, will go hand in hand with
disturbances of the production process, so that not the market solution but less
efficient outcomes will be realized. In the extreme case, Hobbesian anarchy may
result. Between this anarchy and the market solution there is a spectrum of
disturbances.
More precisely, let a and a be the abilities in the non-disrupted and the˜i i
disrupted situation, respectively, 6 with a -a , is1,2. Assume further that in the˜i i
disrupted state no redistributive taxation takes place. 7 Denote by u the maximal˜ i
utility level that individual i can achieve in the disrupted economy. Since a -a ,˜i i
it follows that u -um. Point A in Fig. 2 represents the utility levels achieved in˜ i i
the disrupted economy. Of course, this in an inefficient point. In the non-disrupted
economy, the utility u would give individual 1 the utility level uD )u .˜ ˜2 1 1
Let us now return to the possibilities open for the less able individual 1 to
refuse an unequal income distribution. Since the focus of the analysis is on the
4  .This rules out what Hirshleifer 1991 calls the strong form of the paradox of power.
5 The second-best utility possibilities frontier is used in Fig. 2, since the point of this paper is not
that more redistribution is possible than described by the second-best utility possibility frontier, but to
show that the range of stable distributions is also constrained on the other side.
6 The disturbance may consist in a permanent change of regime like a revolution or in transient
interruptions as strikes. The essential point is that life-time income and utility positions are different in
 .the two states disrupted and non-disrupted, respectively , because the ability to earn income is
disturbed at least in some periods.
7 The assumption is only made to keep things simple. The important thing is that there is some
benchmark situation which is worse than the market solution.
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Fig. 2. Second-best frontier.
distribution of labour income, not of property income or wealth, I do not consider
theft as a feasible mean of redistribution. Income is generated by an individual’s
efforts and abilities and the ability to earn income cannot be transferred. 8 Thus,
the only means of rebellion against the prevailing distribution is to threaten
disruption.
Suppose that the poor have the power to shift the economy from an orderly
 . 9situation to the disrupted state As u , u . Can the poor use this power to˜ ˜1 2
achieve a more egalitarian distribution? Obviously, the answer depends on whether
the poor can credibly threaten to implement the disturbance. With a credible
threat, the rich will accept any distribution u Gu leaving the poor with a utility˜2 2
level up to uD in return for not revolting. This describes the potential gain of the1
poor by threatening to exit the established economic order.
Of course, to be credible the threat must also involve some cost. The economic
order will be stable, if incomes are so distributed that a credible threat does not
pay. The next questions to be dealt with are thus: What makes a threat credible,
8 This is evident as far as human capital is concerned. But also technical equipment is often only
usable in combination with special skills.
9 Of course, one can argue that also the rich could have the power to generate disturbances. The
consequences can be analysed in a completely analogous way. See Section 5 for further discussion of
this point.
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and under which circumstances are the gains from a credible threat higher than the
cost?
These questions are answered in Section 4 by describing the possible strategies
of the poor and the rich in an extensive-form game and characterizing the
subgame-perfect equilibrium. The basic idea is that one can only threaten to revolt,
if some preparatory activities are made. 10 Such preparatory activities involve
costs and the risk of loss of reputation if these costs were incurred in vain. I will
assume that the costs of loss of reputation are an increasing function of the
preparation costs incurred. 11 Under this assumption, a definite border line exists
between those distributions which can be credibly threatened by disturbances and
those which cannot. I call this line the social stability constraint.
4. The stability constraint
 .Consider the following extensive-form game represented in Fig. 3 . Before the
game starts, the government chooses a tax policy leading to utility level u fori
individual i, is1,2.
 .  .In stage 1, individual 1 decides whether to threaten to revolt T or not NT . If
individual 1 decides not to threaten, the game ends, and the respective pay-offs are
 .  .u , u . Threatening means: Individual 1 demands redistribution from u , u to1 2 1 2
 D . Du , u , and threatens to revolt if this demand will not be accepted. u is the˜1 2 1
utility feasible for individual 1 if individual 2 receives in the non-disrupted
economy the same utility level, u , which he would achieve in the disrupted˜2
 .economy recall Fig. 2 . The threat must be accompanied by activities of individ-
ual 1 to prepare for the revolt. Individual 1 can decide how intensive this
w x preparation is, that is, he chooses a level of preparation cost cg 0, u measured˜1
.in terms of utility . This cost is sunk. If T and NT lead to the same pay-off,
individual 1 avoids confrontation and chooses NT. u is the utility level achieved˜1
by individual 1 in the disrupted economy.
 .  .In stage 2, individual 2 chooses to accept A or to refuse NA the request. If
 D .he accepts, the game ends with the pay-offs u yc, u . If A and NA lead to the˜1 2
same pay-off, individual 2 avoids confrontation and chooses A.
 .  .In stage 3, individual 1 chooses whether to revolt R or not NR . If he revolts,
 .u yc, u is realized. If he does not implement the announced revolt, he incurs a˜ ˜1 2
 .reputation loss r c which depends on the intensity with which the revolt was
10 These can be the set up of networks capable to organize strikes and obstructions or, if more radical
forms of revolt are considered, rearmament.
11 For a single individual acting on his own behalf, the costs of losing his reputation may have only
unpleasant psychological consequences. But if we think of i as the representative of a class of
individuals, lost reputation implies more serious damages. Class-unity can be destroyed, and a coward
representative i may loose not only the face but also the head.
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Fig. 3. Distribution and game of threat.
  . X .   . .prepared r 0 s0 and r )0 . Thus, the pay-offs are u ycyr c , u , if the1 2
revolt is not implemented. If R and NR lead to the same pay-off, individual 1
chooses R. We consequently have the following.
D  .  .  D.Proposition 1: For u Fu , u and r c , let c u , u and u u , u be˜ ˜ ˜ ˜1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
implicitly defined by the conditions
r c su yu , 1 .  .˜1 1
Du su yc u ,u . 2 .˜ .1 1 1 1
 . .Then, X, R , A with
DNT, if u Gu u ,u˜ .1 1 1 1Xs T c u ,u , otherwise .˜ .1 1
  . .is a subgame-perfect equilibrium T c means ‘Threaten with preparation cost c’ .
( )J. FalkingerrEuropean Journal of Political Economy 15 1999 35–5144
 .Proof by backward induction . In stage 3, type 1 will choose R if
u Gu yr c . 3 .  .˜1 1
Then, individual 2 obtains the same payoff with A as with NA. By assumption,
2 chooses A in such a situation. Thus, individual 1 can obtain the payoff uD-c if1
he chooses T with preparation cost c in stage 1. The lower is the preparation level
 .c, the higher is this payoff. However, if c is too low, then condition 3 will not
hold, that is, the threat will no longer be credible. Maximization of the payoff
D  .u -c subject to restriction 3 gives us for the optimal choice of c the condition:1
 .  .  X .r c su -u , which defines a unique c u , u with EcrEu use r )0 . With this˜ ˜1 1 1 1 1
preparation-cost level the payoff, which individual 1 obtains, if he chooses T in
D  .stage 1, is u -c u , u . Hence, he will choose NT, if˜1 1 1
u GuD yc u ,u , 4 . .˜1 1 1
D  ..  .and T with cost c u , u otherwise. Since for u su u , u equality holds in˜ ˜1 1 1 1 1 1
 .  .Eq. 4 , and since the right-hand-side of inequality 4 is a decreasing function of
D .  .u , condition 4 is equivalent to: u Gu u , u . Q.E.D.˜1 1 1 1 1
D .Proposition 1 establishes a borderline u u , u separating the two types of˜1 1 1
 .  .distributions, i where the poor will react by threatening to revolt, and ii stable
distributions for which such a threat is not an equilibrium strategy. Fig. 4 shows
the borderline. For utility distributions to the right of this line, the costs of a
Fig. 4. Stability constraint.
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credible threat exceed the gains. If the utility distribution lies to the left of the line,
then individual 1 will threaten to revolt and individual 2 accepts u . However,˜2
since the threat involves preparation costs, individual 1 achieves only uD yc.1
Thus, an inefficient point I results if the initial distribution does not lie in the
stable segment HR of the utility-possibilities frontier. The second-best utility
 .frontier is thus not FR but HR. Points on the segment FH broken line are not
feasible. An initial distribution on this segment would lead to some inefficient
point I. To avoid inefficient redistribution by threat, the role is specified for the
state to ensure a distribution in the stable region to the right of stability constraint
u .1
What determines the position of the social stability constraint? For an explicit
solution, we must specify the form of the reputation-loss function r. For instance,
 .with r c sac we obtain:
a uD q u˜1 1
u s . 5 .1 1qa
This illustrates the essential properties of the stability constraint, which are
 .  .more generally, from Eqs. 1 and 2 ,
D Du Fu u ,u Fu . 6 .˜ ˜ .1 1 1 1 1
 . 12Moreover, from Eq. 2 :
DE u rE u )0 and E u rE u )0 7 .˜1 1 1 1
Since the slope of the utility-possibilities frontier is negative, uD increases if u˜1 2
decreases. In sum, the stability constraint is shifted towards more egalitarian
distributions, if point A in Fig. 4 is moved to the right or downward i.e., to the
.south-east . A move of A to the right means that individual 1 is relatively robust
in the sense that his ability and thus the utility level realized in the disrupted
economy is comparatively high. A point A lying further downward means that
individual 2 is relatively fragile so that his loss in ability and utility is relatively
high when the economy is disrupted. Robustness or fragility of the two types of
population accordingly determines the position of the stability constraint.
Abilities based on complex organizational networks and technical equipment
are probably more vulnerable to destabilization. If particularly the more able
depend on the complex technology, 13 the market distribution, based on abilities in
a stable economy, is more distant from the set of feasible distributions. This
suggests that the stability problem and thus the stabilization function of the state
become more important in an advanced economy.
12 Use EcrEu )0 and EcrEu -0.˜1 1
13 Remember that by assumption ability-producing techniques cannot be transferred but can be
destroyed.
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5. Revolt of the poor or revolt of the rich?
I have considered only the possibility of a revolt by the poor. We may find
plausible reasons why rich people are less inclined than poor to strike or revolt.
After all, able individuals are protected against too egalitarian redistribution by the
possibility of withdrawing their participation in the production of the redistributed
output. There may also be reasons that rich people are less capable to organize a
strike or revolt since they are more individualistic.
Within my model, an analogous calculus of revolt exists for the rich. In
principle, they can threaten to destabilize the economic order if they wish to
change the income distribution in their favor. This implies a second stability
 .constraint derived in an analogous way as u :1
Du Gu u ,u , 8 .˜ .2 2 2 2
where uD is the utility level that individual 2 gets if 1 has u in the non-disrupted˜2 1
economy. Fig. 5 illustrates the consequences of this constraint and its interrelation-
ship with constraint u .1
The feasible region of stable income distributions is restricted to the arc HK.
Distributions outside this region are rejected by either individual 1 or 2. Thus,
redistribution policy is confined to this region. The following proposition presents
a sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the stable region.
Fig. 5. Region of stable distributions.
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D D .Proposition 2: Let u u , u be the stability constraint corresponding to u , u ,˜ ˜i i i i i
 . < .is1, 2. Let S be the set of stable distributions, S:s u , u u , u is feasible1 2 1 2
D . 4and u Gu u , u , is1, 2 .˜i i i i
 .i If
D Du yu u yu˜1 1 1 1F , 9 .D u y u˜u y u˜ 2 22 2
then S is not empty.
 .  .ii If reputation cost is linear with r c sa c, is1, 2, the sufficienti i
 .condition 9 for the non-emptiness of S reduces to
a a F1. 10 .1 2
Proof.
 .i Since the utility-possibilities frontier is concave, it is sufficient for the
non-emptiness of S that the point of intersection of u and u , that is B in Fig. 5,1 2
  .  ..  D.  . Dlies below or on the line defined by u b , u b sb u , u q 1-b u ,˜1 2 1 2 1
D D. 4  .  .  .  .u , 0FbF1 . Set bs u -u r u -u . Then, u su b and u Fu b as˜ ˜2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2
 .  .long as inequality 9 holds. This proves part i of the proposition.
D .  .  .  .ii According to Eq. 5 , u s a u qu r 1qa in this case. Using this in˜i i i i i
 .  D .  D .  . D .  DEq. 9 , we obtain the condition u -u r u -u F 1qa u -u r u -˜ ˜ ˜1 1 2 2 2 i 1 2
.  ..  .u a 1qa which is equivalent to Eq. 10 . Q.E.D.˜2 2 1
Fig. 5 permits some further qualitative conclusions concerning the range of
stable efficient distributions. First, for AsM, HK collapses to M. That means
that the market distribution is the only stable outcome if destabilization has no
negative effect on agents’ efficiency. This is, however, an unrealistic case.
Secondly, both the market outcome M and also the Rawlsian solution may lie
outside the stable range HK. 14 The rich may protest against a relatively egalitar-
ian distribution before R is reached, if their abilities are not too vulnerable. The
Rawlsian solution is, however, feasible if A is sufficiently low, that is, if the
ability of the more able individual 2 is strongly affected by disturbances of the
economy. 15 Generally, the stable region is biased in favor of the more robust type
of individual whose abilities under disturbances deviate comparatively less from
the abilities under a stable order.
This robustness can be expected to change at the different stages of economic
development. In an advanced society people with high abilities, working with
14  .This explains a weak form of the paradox of power of Hirshleifer 1991 .
15 Revolting means disturbances for both parties regardless of the question of who is the initiator.
Consider, for example, strikes or lock-outs.
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Fig. 6. Non-feasibility of stable distributions.
complex communication networks and high technology, may be particularly
vulnerable to disturbances, which biases the stable region in favor of more
egalitarian distributions. 16 In a more primitive economy where abilities are based
on physical strength or instinct, the strong will be strong under orderly as well as
disordered circumstances. So the stable region will be biased towards inequality.
A stable region of distributions need not exist. Proposition 2 gives a sufficient
condition for non-emptiness, if disturbances by the poor or by the rich lead to the
same point A. This is realistic at an advanced level of economic development
when all abilities require stable conditions and production activities are highly
interdependent. In an undeveloped economy with less interdependencies, a group
may disrupt the economy in a way which hits the production possibilities of the
others without doing much harm to the own group. In other words, the utility
 I I .levels A s u , u , resulting from disruption by the poor, are different from the˜ ˜I 1 2
 II II.utility levels A s u , u achieved if the economy is disrupted by the rich. Fig.˜ ˜II 1 2
6 illustrates this possibility for the case that the production activities of the two
groups are completely independent. Only distributions in the North-East of point B
would be stable in this case. They are, however, unfeasible.
16 The Kuznets-curve literature following the work of Kuznets, 1955; see e.g., Kakwani, 1980,
.Chap. 17 , according to which incomes are distributed more equally in advanced economies than in less
developed countries, shows that this suggestion is in line with reality.
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The higher the efficiency losses caused by a revolt, that is, the more the utility
outcome is moved towards the origin when the economy is disrupted, the less
likely the stable region will be empty. Hence, at a low level of development, when
abilities are less interdependent, no stable distribution may be feasible. But in a
developed economy where production activities are interdependent and stable
conditions are required for all abilities, a region of stable distribution exists. If a
point within the region is not realized, inefficient games of threat are provoked.
6. Conclusion
This paper has analysed the relationship between income distribution and
economic efficiency in a two-class model of social stability. To avoid inefficient
disruption, income distribution is required to lie in a range compatible with a
stable economic order. The model has characterised the properties of this socially
stable range.
The model assumes that the population can be grouped into two classes based
on abilities. The distinction between skilled and unskilled, or between en-
trepreneurial and non-entrepreneurial people, constitutes the basis for the model.
Coalitions between members of the two different classes are excluded. With more
than two classes, non-stable outcomes are to be expected if no further restrictions
are imposed. The model also views each class as represented by one agent.
Co-ordination problems within each group are therefore not considered. The threat
costs considered in the model do, however, take into account that within-class
co-ordination requires costly measures.
At lower levels of development, with less sophisticated abilities and less
interdependent production, a stable income distribution may not exist, implying
ongoing instability and alternating revolts. In an advanced economy with more
vulnerable productive abilities, the set of stable distributions is not empty. This
implies that in less developed societies, there may be no feasible role for the state
to guarantee stability by redistributing income. Such a role is, however, indicated
by the stable region of income distributions for advanced societies. This is
consistent with the observation that the share of the redistributive budget in
national income is higher in richer countries. 17 With the spread of complex and
interdependent production at the international level, a role for distribution policy to
guarantee social stability may also develop in the context of international relations.
My model has abstracted from other influences, such as a value system or a
dictatorship which enforces stability apart from equity considerations, and from
non-economic sources of revolts and instability, such as tribal rivalry and national-
17  .An alternative explanation is provided by Demsetz 1982 who argues that the increase in
specialization has created more interest groups demanding interventionistic programs.
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ism. Income is also derived solely from ability-based efforts. Insofar as people
possess wealth which can be appropriated by others, theft is an alternative to threat
of disruption of economic activity. This alternative is excluded in a model which
focuses on abilities.
Acknowledgements
I wish to thank S. Gachter, University of Zurich, N. Baigent, University of¨ ¨
Graz, J. K. Brunner and J. Zweimuller, University of Linz, the participants of the¨
Public Economics Research Seminar at Munich and of the Colloquium ‘Applied
Microeconomics’ at Humboldt-Universitat Berlin, two anonymous referees and the¨
editors for valuable comments.
References
Aktinson, A.B., Stiglitz, J.E., 1980. Lectures on Public Economics. McGraw-Hill, London.
Alesina, A., Perotti, R., 1996. Income distribution, political instability, and investment. European
Economic Review 40, 1203–1228.
Aumann, R.J., Kurz, M., 1977. Power and taxes. Econometrica 45, 1137–1161.
Bellettini, G., 1998. Aggregate uncertainty, political instability and income redistribution. European
Journal of Political Economy 14, 19–33.
 .Benabou, R., 1996. Inequality and growth. In: Bernanke, B.-S., Rotemberg, J.J. Eds. , NBER´
Macroeconomics Annual, MIT Press, Cambridge, pp. 11–92, including comments and discussion.
Brennan, G., 1973. Pareto desirable redistribution: the non-altruistic dimension. Public Choice 14,
43–67.
Buchanan, J.M., 1975a. The Limits of Liberty: Between Anarchy and Leviathan. Chicago Univ. Press,
Chicago.
 .Buchanan, J.M., 1975b. The Samaritan’s dilemma. In: Phelps, E.S. Ed. , Altruism, Moraltity and
Economic Theory. Russell Sage Foundation, New York.
Buchanan, J.M., Faith, R.L., 1987. Secession and the limits of taxation: toward a theory of internal
exit. American Economic Review 77, 1023–1031.
Demsetz, H., 1982. Economic, Legal, and Political Dimensions of Competition, Amsterdam, North
Holland.
Grossman, H.I., 1995. Robin Hood and the redistribution of property income. European Journal of
Political Economy 11, 399–410.
Gupta, D.K., 1977. The Socio-economic cost of unemployment and income inequality: A cross-na-
tional study, PhD diss., University of Pittsburgh.
Gupta, D.K., Venieris, Y.P., 1981. Introducing new dimensions in macro models: the sociopolitical and
institutional environments. Economic Development and Cultural Change 30, 31–58.
Hibbs, D.A., 1973. Mass Political Violence: A Cross-national Causal Analysis. Wiley, New York.
Hirshleifer, J., 1991. The paradox of power. Economics and Politics 3, 177–200.
Hirshleifer, J., 1995. Anarchy and its breakdown. Journal of Political Economy 103, 26–52.
Hochman, H.M., Rodgers, J.D., 1969. Pareto optimal redistribution. American Economic Review 59,
542–557.
Hochman, H.M., Rodgers, J.D., 1974. Redistribution and the pareto criterion. American Economic
Review 64, 752–757.
( )J. FalkingerrEuropean Journal of Political Economy 15 1999 35–51 51
Huntington, S.P., 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. Yale Univ. Press, New Haven.
Kakwani, N.C., 1980. Income Inequality and Poverty. Methods of Estimation and Policy Applications.
Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford.
Kimenyi, M.S., Mbaku, J.M., 1995. Rents, military elites, and political democracy. European Journal
of Political Economy 11, 699–708.
Kuznets, S., 1955. Economic growth and income inequality. American Economic Review 45, 1–28.
Mirrlees, J.A., 1971. An exploration in the theory of optimum income taxation. Review of Economic
Studies 38, 175–208.
Mishan, E.J., 1972. The futility of pareto-efficient distributions. American Economic Review 62,
971–976.
Nitzan, S., 1994. Modelling rent-seeking contests. European Journal of Political Economy 10, 41–60.
Perotti, R., 1996. Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say. Journal of Economic
Growth 1, 149–187.
Rawls, J., 1971. A Theory of Justice. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, MA.
Russett, B.M., 1970. Inequality and instability: the relation of land tenure to political instability. In:
 .Nordlinger, E.A. Ed. , Politics and Society. Prentice-Hall, London.
Skaperdas, St., 1992. Cooperation, conflict, and power in the absence of property rights. American
Economic Review 82, 720–739.
Stiglitz, J.E., 1987. Pareto efficient and optimal taxation and the new welfare economics. In: Auerbach,
 .A.J., Feldstein, M. Eds. , Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. II. Amsterdam, North-Holland, pp.
991–1042.
Taylor, C., Hudson, M.T., 1972. World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators. Yale Univ. Press,
New Haven.
Venieris, Y.P., Gupta, D.K., 1989. Socio-political and economic dimensions of development: a
cross-section model. Economic Development and Cultural Change 31, 727–756.
